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I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the concept of easements may seem basic and
easy to comprehend. An easement is generally defined as the right
t J.D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Boston Col-
lege, summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 1997.
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to use another's land for a limited purpose that is not inconsistent
with the landowner's interest in that land.1 However, much litiga-
tion occurs over the subtleties that exist in easement law, causing
confusion and ultimately making the law concerning easements dif-
ficult to apply.2 Particularly susceptible to confusion are the differ-
ent ways in which easements can be created and destroyed.3 This
case note examines the current state of the law in Minnesota re-
garding the termination of easements by merger and the rights
maintained or destroyed by those who hold an outstanding interest
in the easement by focusing on the recent Minnesota Supreme
Court decision Pergament v. Loring Properties Limited 4
It is well established that easements terminate when the domi-
nant and servient estates come under common ownership and pos-
5 6session. This is commonly known as the merger doctrine. How-
ever, when there lies an outstanding possessory interest in the
78easement, no merger can take place.8 Of particular concern, is
whether a mortgage qualifies as an outstanding possessory interest
so as to prevent termination of an easement by merger. In Perga-
ment, the supreme court concluded that the mortgage exception to
the merger doctrine is intended to protect only those mortgagees
and their successors in interest and does not work to prevent ter-
1. 28A C.J.S. Easements (1996).
2. Elliot L. Epstein & Ronald L. Bissonnette, Easements Ain't So Easy, 15 ME.
B.J. 52, 52 (2000); see alsoJohn W. Weaver, Easements are Nuisances, 25 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 103, 106 (1990). "Because an easement is a privilege to make a use
of another's land, there are problems at the margins of the concept." Id.
3. Epstein & Bissonnette, supra note 2, at 52-57 (describing the different
ways easements can be created and terminated). Easements may arise through
express grant or reservation, and in some cases may be implied by law. Id. at 52.
Easements may be extinguished by release, misuse, abandonment, expiration,
mortgage foreclosure, and upon merger of the dominant and servient estates. Id.
at 57; see also Weaver, supra note 2, at 106 (theorizing that most problems with
easements concern the creation and scope of easements).
4. 599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999).
5. Knud E. Hermasen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Roads and Easements, 48
ME. L. REv. 197, 268 (1996) (stating that "when the servient and dominant estates
combine or come together, the easement will cease").
6. 28A C.J.S. Easements § 123 (1996) (defining the merger doctrine gener-
ally). "Where ownership in, or title to, the dominant and servient estates becomes
united in one person an easement is extinguished by merger." Id.
7. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 527 (7" ed. 1999) (defining easement). "An in-
terest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control
the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose." Id.
8. Hermasen & Richards, supra note 5 (stating that in order for an easement
to terminate by merger, "the title to the dominant and servient estates must be co-
extensive, equal in validity, quality and all other circumstances").
1332 [Vol. 27:2
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mination of an easement as to the owners in fee.9
This note begins by examining the evolution of easement law
and provides a general background for understanding the rights
belonging to an easement holder.t Next, this note gives a brief in-
troduction to the merger doctrine, the mortgage exception, and
how both have been received by Minnesota law." Part III examines
the facts of the Pergament case and discusses the analysis of the case
as it moved through the courts. Part IV discusses the court's analy-
sis and reasoning for its decision. Finally, this note concludes that
the Supreme court's decision in the Pergament case is consistent
with case law from other states and is supported by the policy to
uphold the value of the mortgagee's security investment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution Of Easements
Although servitudes 2 have been recognized at common law
since medieval times," easements did not gain importance until the
Industrial Revolution when railroads and other industry needed
access to, or, use of a particular piece of land. 14 Right-of-ways, wa-
ter, drainage, sewage, gas and other utilities are just some of the
ways in which easements are used today. 5 More recently, ease-
ments have been used for conservation purposes,16 as well as for fi-
9. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 151.
10. Infra Parts II, A-E.
11. Infra Parts 11, F & G.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.1 cmt. a (1998) (de-
fining a servitude as a generic term used to describe the legal devices used to cre-
ate certain rights and obligations that run with the land at law); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the three different types of servi-
tudes as profits, easements, and licenses).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, ch. 1, introductory note
(1998). Roman law recognized a variety of servitudes, including the "right to dig
and burn lime, pasture cattle, draw and transport water, encroach on a neighbor's
airspace, and fights to light, view, and support." Id. "Easements, both the idea
and the word were known to the medieval common law, but an easement was only
one of a variety of incorporeal hereditaments." Weaver, supra note 2. Easements
and profit categories emerged in the Nineteenth century. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, ch. 1, introductory note (1998).
14. Weaver, supra note 2, at 106-07 (illustrating the modern day need for
easements).
15. Epstein & Bissonnette, supra note 2, at 53 (stating the different purposes
for which easements are used including utility, telephone and cable lines).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. h (1998) (de-
scribing conservation easements as the most common form of negative easements
used in modern law); see generally Katherine S. Anderson & Marybeth K. Jones,
13332000]
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ber optic cable and television lines.17 Due to the prolific changes in
technology over the past century, many of the old doctrines con-
cerning easements have become outmoded and have yet to be re-
examined in light of modern day needs."
B. Easement Rights In A Modern World
Although the use of easements has increased in the last cen-
tury, the rights belonging to an easement holder have remained
virtually the same. As defined earlier, an easement is a property in-
terest which allows the owner of such interest the limited use and
enjoyment of land, which is in the possession of another. 9 Essen-
tially, it is the right to use another's land, known as the servient es-20
tate, for a specific purpose and "does not displace the general pos-
session of the land by its owner."
2
1
It is important to note that "[a]n easement is not and cannotS,,22
become a possessory interest. To get a better understanding of
just where easement rights are placed on the continuum of prop-
erty rights, courts often rely on the analogy of property rights as a
bundle of sticks.23 Fee simple title represents the whole bundle,
Conservation Easements: An Essential Tool in the Practitioner's Estate Planning Toolbox,
35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 183, 190 (2000) (describing how conservation easements
can be used to protect habitat, open space and scenic views).
17. See generally Jill K. Pearson, Balancing Private Property Rights with Public Inter-
ests: Compensating Landowners for the Use of Railroad Corridors for Fiber-Optic Technology,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1769 (2000) (giving a general discussion on the increased need
for regulation of easements used for fiber-optic technology).
18. Weaver, supra note 2, at 108; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. a (1998) (explaining the historical progression of easements
from Roman law to modern times). "Classification of servitudes into easements,
profits, and covenants is relatively recent." Id. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES reflects the continuing evolution of the law of servitudes
and is designed to meet the needs of the 21st century American society. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES Ch. 1, introductory note (1998); see also 7
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-42 (2d ed. 1937) (describ-
ing the history of easements and the increased importance of easements in mod-
ern law).
19. 4 RIcHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 34.02 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2000) (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 450
(a) (1944)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1)
(1998) (defining an easement).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (1998) (defining the
servient estate as an interest in land which bears an obligation or burden).
21. Schadewald v. Brule, 570 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
22. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 499, cmt. a (1944).
23. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (analogizing prop-
erty to a "bundle of rights" comprised of numerous sticks, such as the right to ex-
4
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24whereas easement rights represent just a few sticks. Because the
owner of a servient estate retains his interest in the land, he may
continue to use the portion of his land that is subject to an ease-
ment for any purpose, so long as it does not unreasonably interfere
with the rights of the easement holder." At the same time, an
easement holder's use of the easement is generally limited to a par-
ticular purpose. 16 If the dominant owner's use of the easement is
beyond the scope of its use, it is said to "overburden" the easement
27and may become actionable as a nuisance.
C. Understanding Easements: Appurtenant vs. In Gross
Easement rights are either attached to the land, in which case
28they are considered appurtenant, or are attached to a particular
29person, in which case they are considered in gross. In the case of30
an appurtenant easement, the land which is benefited is referred
to as the dominant estate while the land that is burdened is re-
31ferred to as the servient estate.
exclude).
24. Pearson, supra note 17, at 1773-74 (illustrating how fee simple represents
all of the sticks while an easement represents just a few sticks of the bundle); see
also Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 102 of Washington County v. Walter, 243 Minn.
159, 161, 66 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1954) (stating that when an easement is given by a
grantor under a conveyance, no estate passes but only a right of use); Romans v.
Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 181, 14 N.W.2d 482, 486 (1944) (holding that an easement
does not carry with it title to or right of possession of the land itself).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (1998) (restating
the rule that the possessor of the servient estate may not do anything to interfere
with the uses authorized by the easement); see also Wilson v. Palmer, 229 A.D.2d
647, 644 N.Y.S.2d 872, 872 (3d Dep't 1996) (holding that placing a speed bump
on a right of way was not unreasonable).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES, § 1.2 cmt. d (1998) (stat-
ing that the holder of an easement may make any use reasonably necessary for a
specified purpose); see also Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254,
258, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1970) (stating that every easement gives privilege to the
owner thereof to make particular uses of the servient tenement and the sum total
of those particular uses make up the extent of the easement).
27. Epstein & Bissonnette, supra note 2, at 54.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERvrrUDES § 1.5 (1998). "'Appurte-
nant' means that the rights or obligations of a servitude are tied to ownership or
occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land." Id.
29. Id. "'In gross' means that the benefit or burden of a servitude is not tied
to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land." Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 453 (1944) (stating that
an easement is "appurtenant to land when the easement is created to benefit and
does benefit the possessor of land in his use of the land.").
31. Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 56, 19 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1945). "[The
term 'servient tenement' signifies that the possessor of the land to which it is ap-
20001 1335
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Easements appurtenant to the land are created to add value to
the dominant estate and benefit the dominant tenant in his use of
the land.3' For example, the parking easement at issue in the Per-
gament case was considered an appurtenant easement and would
33belong to whomever owned the adjacent apartment property.
Easement rights attached to a particular person can be easily
confused with licenses,34 which are generally non-transferable and
more limited in scope than easements attached to the land.15 For
36this reason, the courts disfavor easements in gross.
When the terms of an easement are ambiguous, the court pre-
sumes the easement to be appurtenant. The law's impartiality to-
wards appurtenant easements is rooted in English law where rights
in land were historically considered more important than personal
rights. 7
Even today, easements appurtenant are considered to be an
inseparable part of the dominant estate and continue to be freely
plied is subject to an easement. The term 'dominant tenement' denotes that the
possessor of the land to which it is applied has, as appurtenant thereto, an ease-
ment over the land." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§§ 455-56 (1944)).
32. Id. at 55-6, 19 N.W.2d at 398 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 453).
33. Pergament v. Loring Props., Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Minn. 1999) (de-
scribing the office property/parking lot as the servient estate and the apartment
property as the dominant estate).
34. 4 POWELL, supra note 19, at § 34.24 (distinguishing easements in gross
from licenses). Licenses are "revocable relationships" whereas easements are "ir-
revocable relationships" in land. Thus an irrevocable license is essentially an ease-
ment. Id. But see Dance v. Tatum, 629 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 1993) (stating that an
irrevocable license is not an easement, does not run with the land, and is not
governed by the merger doctrine). But see Alan David Hegi, The Easement in Gross
Revisited: Transferability and Divisibility Since 1945, 39 VAND. L. REV. 109-10 (1986)
(stating that the difference between licenses and easements in gross is one of ter-
minology and not of substance); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 512
(1944).
35. Hegi, supra note 34, at 113. Traditionally, courts held that easements in
gross were neither transferable nor divisible because the easement rights were
considered personal to the easement holder. Id.
36. Id.
37. John Pendergrass, Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields: Using Institu-
tional Controls to Protect Public Health, 29 ENVrL. L. REP. 10243, (1999) (describing
how common law disfavored easements in gross because personal rights were con-
sidered a limited interest in land); see also Hegi, supra note 34, at 113 (1986) (de-
scribing how the American courts adopted the English rule that easements in
gross could not be assigned); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVrrUDES § 1.5
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transferable, whereas easements in gross are generally non-
transferable.' 8 Because the law prefers land to be freely transfer-
able, the law favors easements appurtenant: s9 Thus, if there is any
possibility that an easement could be said to be related to some
40land, the courts presume the easement to be appurtenant.
D. Scope
Intent of the parties, manifested in the words of the grant,
regulates the extent or scope of an easement. If the intent of the
parties cannot be construed from the language in the grant, the
courts look to the surrounding circumstances to determine the in-
tended nature of the easement. 42 Courts are fairly generous in
their interpretation of easements and tend to give the easement
41holder a great deal of discretion in his or her use of the easement.
E. Duration
Once an easement has been created, it may endure forever in
the absence of any terms or conditions limiting its duration.
44
Modern courts generally interpret easements appurtenant to last
for an infinite duration unless the written instrument creating the
38. Hegi, supra note 34, at 114. Examples of non-transferable easements in
gross are hunting, fishing, camping, private rights of way and private rights of stor-
age. Id. at 120. But see Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n., 200 A. 646,
651 (Pa. 1938) (holding that easements in gross are transferable when used for
commercial purposes).
39. Hegi, supra note 34, at 115-116.
40. Id. at 120 (illustrating how the presumption against easements in gross is
so strong that some courts have labeled easements appurtenant when they were
unambiguously in gross); Pendergrass, supra note 37.
41. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04(a) (1994) (quoting Commercial
Wharf E. Condo. Ass'n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66, 76 (Mass.
1990)).
42. Id. (stating that the court must look to the words in the deed as well as the
situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances to determine the na-
ture of an easement).
43. Id. "If the grant is not clear, the court will interpret the scope of the
easement in favor of 'free and untrammeled use of the land." Id. (citing Gisler v.
Allen, 693 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Brady v. Yodenza, 493 Pa. 186, 189, 425 A.2d 726, 727 (1981) (holding
that "[a] n expressly created easement appurtenant can conceivably last forever");
see also Pearson, supra note 17, at 1777 (stating that whereas most easements can
conceivably last forever in the absence of terms and conditions, railroad easements
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easement shows the parties intended otherwise.45
F. Termination
An appurtenant easement may terminate according to the
limitations inherent in its creation, or be extinguished by events
subsequent to its creation.47 An easement's termination may be ei-
ther partial or complete. 4s The dominant tenant may terminate aneasement by formally releasing 49 his rights or by abandonment.50
45. Steele v. Pfeifer, 310 N.W.2d 782, 786-787 (S.D. 1981) (stating that "when
no such limitation exists, [an easement] has generally been held to be permanent
in nature and would continue in operation forever, unless abandoned"); JOHN W.
BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 9.01
(1988) (stating that easements are almost always created without duration and may
theoretically last in perpetuity).
46. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 41 cited in Burnquist v. Cook, 220
Minn. 48, 55, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945). When an easement ceases to exist after a
term prescribed in its creation, the "termination of the easement is due to limita-
tions contained in its creation." Id.
47. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES ch. 41, introductory
note. "Extinguishment... includes only termination by events which occur subse-
quent to the creation of an easement and which are not included within the limi-
tation of its creation." Id.; POWELL, supra note 19, at § 34.18 (stating that an ease-
ment can expire according to the limitations inherent in its creation or be
extinguished by events subsequent to its creation).
48. Burnquist, 220 Minn. at 55, 19 N.W.2d at 398 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF PROPERTY ch. 41, introductory note); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 41,
introductory note (suggesting that an easement may terminate in whole perma-
nently, in whole for a time, in part permanently or in part for a time). See also RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 503 (1944). "Whether the extinguishment of an
easement accomplished by a formal release is complete or partial is determined by
the particular language used construed in the light of the circumstances under
which the release was made." Id.
49. Flaten v. City of Moorhead, 58 Minn. 324, 326, 59 N.W. 1044, 1044 (1894)
(holding that a deed, without reservation, by a railroad company to the owner of
an estate in the land, will release a right of way thereon); see also POWELL, supra
note 19, at § 34.18 (citing Adams v. Battle, 125 N.C. 152, 152, 34 S.E. 245, 245
(1899)).
It was an old, ironclad maxim of the common law that an obligor would
only be released by an instrument of as high dignity as that by which he
was bound; that is, being obligated by seal, he could be released only by
an instrument under seal. Technically this is the rule of modern times,
unless changed by statute, but practically it is seldom enforced. To this
rule the exceptions were and are so numerous that seldom can the rule
be applied.
Id.
50. United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 278, 101
N.W.2d 208, 212 (1960) (stating that an easement may be lost by abandonment
where the owner of the dominant estate has made no use of the easement and his
conduct is such as to evidence an intention to abandon); see also Desotell v. Szczy-
[Vol. 27:21338
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 39
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/39
PERGAMENT V LORING PROPERTIES, LTD.
An easement may also be terminated by the servient tenant, usually
through prescription' or by conveying the easement to a bona fide
purchaser. Termination by merger 3 and estoppe154 require the
participation of both the dominant and servient tenant for an
giel, 338 Mass. 153, 159, 154 N.E.2d 698, 702 (1958) (holding that mere nonuse of
an easement is not sufficient to establish an intent to abandon unless nonuse is
accompanied by affirmative and unequivocal acts which are inconsistent with con-
tinued existence of the easement); Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands,
672 A.2d 91, 94 (Me. 1996) (finding abandonment of an easement, given that the
leasehold rights were inconsistent with an intention to maintain those previously
enjoyed under the easement); Richards Asphalt Co. v. Bunge Corp., 399 N.W.2d
188, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that mere nonuse of an easement does
not necessarily evidence an intent to abandon); Simms v. William Simms Hard-
ware, 216 Minn. 283, 291, 12 N.W.2d 783, 787 (1943) (recognizing that an ease-
ment may be lost by abandonment but mere nonuse will not extinguish it).
51. Glatts v. Henson, 31 Cal. 2d 368, 371, 188 P.2d 745, 747 (1948).
The extinguishment of an easement by prescription may be compared
with the acquisition of an easement by that method. It is true that a per-
son cannot own an easement in his own property the interests become
merged, but where he is so using his land that the elements of adverse
possession prevail as to the easement owned by another, he is in a sense
acquiring that easement-having it merge with his fee interest-
eliminating that interest of another in his land.
Id. Nordin v. Kuno, 287 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Minn. 1980) (holding that to establish
an easement by prescription, a party must prove use for prescriptive period of fif-
teen years and that use was hostile, actual, open, continuous and exclusive).
52. Smith v. Lockwood, 100 Minn. 221, 223, 110 N.W. 980, 980 (1907) (hold-
ing that when the original owner, who is in possession of the whole, thereafter sells
the second tract to a bona fide purchaser admittedly without actual knowledge,
such purchaser takes the premises free from the implied easement).
53. 3 TIFFA NTY REAL PROPERTY § 822 (3d ed. 1939). "An easement is ordinarily
extinguished if one person acquires an estate in fee simple in possession in both
the dominant and servient tenements." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP-
ERTY § 497 cmts. b & h (1944) (illustrating the merger doctrine).
54. Davidson v. Kretz, 127 Minn. 313, 313, 149 N.W. 652, 652 (1914) (holding
that an easement may be extinguished or modified by a fully executed parol
agreement, and an oral agreement that the fee owner may erect a permanent
building over part of one side of the way, extinguishes the old easement to the ex-
tent of the obstruction, and gives a right to use the new way as a substitute for the
old, at least as long as the obstruction continues); see also 3 TiFFA NY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 826 (3d ed. 1939).
It has been decided that if one who has an easement in another's land
gives a license to the owner of the servient tenement to do something
thereon, the effect of which is to obstruct the exercise of the easement,
and the licensee, on the faith of the license, makes expenditures for im-
provements obstructive of the easement, the easement is extinguished.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 505(c) (1944) (stating that termination of
an easement by estoppel happens when "the restoration of the privilege of use au-
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easement to terminate. Mortgage foreclosures, 5 eminent domain 6
and tax sales57 are examples of ways in which an easement may be
extinguished by outside entities.
58
G. Termination Of Easements By Merger
Minnesota has long recognized the rule that easements are ex-
tinguished when the dominant and servient estates come under
common ownership. 9 Minnesota adopted the merger doctrine in
Burnquist v. Cook. Other states follow the general rule regarding
55. Infra Part III(B).
56. In reAppeal of Sowers, 175 Minn. 168, 220 N.W. 419 (1928) (holding that
when a right of way is not exclusive, owners are not entitled to compensation by
the state for taking the property); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 507 cmt. a
(1944) (illustrating extinguishment of an easement by the state through eminent
domain).
57. Extinguishment of an easement by tax sale is the minority rule. E.g. Wolf-
son v. Heins, 6 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1942) ("in this State...an easement is de-
stroyed by the tax sale of the servient estate); Nedderman v. City of Des Moines,
268 N.W. 36, 38 (Iowa 1936) (stating that a covenant running with the title was ex-
tinguished by a tax sale and deed); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 175 P.2d
133, 144 (Kan. 1947) (overruled on other grounds by Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Moore, 297 P.2d 183 (Kan. 1956)); City ofJackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss. 818, 199 So.
91 (1940). But see Alvin v.Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 260, 63 N.W.2d 22, 24 (1974)
(expressing the majorty rule). "An easement appurtenant is not extinguished by a
sale and conveyance of the land subject to it for nonpayment of a tax assessed
against such land." Id.; see also Schlafy v. Bauman, 108 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo. 1937)
(following the majority rule that an appurtenant easement is not extinguished by
tax sale); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 289, 66 P.2d 792, 796 (Mont.
1937); Doherty v. Rice, 3 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Wis. 1942); Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d
597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1952); 3 COOLEY, TAXATION § 1494 (4 ed.). "Ordinarily, a tax
sale does not divest easements charged on the property sold. Thus, private ease-
ments of light, air and access of adjoining owners over the land sold are not extin-
guished by the tax-sale." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 509 (1944). In the absence of a separate tax upon it, an easement in gross is ex-
tinguished by a sale and conveyance of the land subject to it for nonpayment of a
tax assessed against such land while an easement appurtenant is not extinguished
by a sale and conveyance of the land subject to it for nonpayment of a tax assessed
against such land. Id.
58. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 507 (1944). "Easements
are property rights and when ownership of them is in private hands they are sub-
ject to extinguishment as other property rights are through the exercise of this
power." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 509 (stating
that an easement can be extinguished for failure to pay taxes on such land).
59. Sorkil v. Strom, 156 Minn. 155, 158, 194 N.W. 333, 334 (1923) (stating
that when an owner of the dominant estate acquires title to the servient estate, the
easement is extinguished).
60. Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 56, 19 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1945). "To as-
sume the existence of an easement appurtenant to land there must be presup-
posed two tracts of land in separate ownerships, a dominant and a servient tene-
1340 [Vol. 27:2
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the termination of easements due to the merging of estates as
well.6
Once an easement has been extinguished by the merging of
dominant and servient estates, transfer of a previously benefited or
burdened parcel into separate ownership does not revive an ease-
ment.62 Because an easement terminates when the dominant and
servient estates are merged, the easement does not arise on its own
and must be created anew.63 This is the law in other states as well.64
ment. If the two tracts come into common ownership they cannot continue to be
dominant and servient, and the easement appurtenant ceases to exist." Id. (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 497 cmt. a (1944)).
61. Dimoff v. Laboroff, 296 N.W. 275, 276 (Mich. 1941) (stating that "[t]he
union of dominant and servient estates in the same owners extinguishes prior
easements" and "[o]ne cannot have an easement in one's own land"); Coast Stor-
age Co. v. Schwartz, 351 P.2d 520, 524 (Wash. 1960) (stating "[w]hen all of the
property.. .passe[s] into the common ownership of the plaintiffs, the easement
originally reserved by [Plaintiff] terminate [s and o]ne cannot have an easement in
his own property"). Id.; see also Roberts v. Monroe, 75 So. 2d 492, 496 (Ala. 1954);
Tract Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Kepler, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1374, 1384-85 (1988); Salazar v.
Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Colo. 1996); Edgell v. Divver, 402 A.2d 395 (Del. Ch
1979); Gardner v. Fliegel, 450 P.2d 990, 994 (Idaho 1969) (stating "one cannot
have an easement in his own lands"); Village of Lake Bluff v. Dalitsch, 114 N.E.2d
654, 659 (Ill. 1953); Sample v. Whittaker, 132 So. 511, 514 (La. 1930); Cheever v.
Graves, 592 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Castle Assocs. v. Schwartz, 407
N.Y.S. 717, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Cecola v. Ruley, 12 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000) (under the "merger doctrine," if an easement exists and then the
owner of that easement acquires a greater estate, the two estates merge into the
greater of the two and the lesser is extinguished); Capital Candy Co. v. Savard, 369
A.2d 1363, 1365 (Vt. 1976).
62. Caroga Realty Co. v. Tapper, 143 N.W.2d 215, 226 n.3 (Minn. 1966) (stat-
ing an "easement [is] not revived or reinstated by reference to it in a conveyance
by the owner of the servient estate"); United Parking Stations v. Calvary Temple,
257 Minn. 273, 278, 101 N.W.2d 208, 212 (1960) (stating "a recital in the contract
for deed... can [not] reinstate or recreate an easement for the benefit of Plaintiff
and her successors in interest, so as to create to them again a dominant estate");
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 497 cmt. h (1944) (restat-
ing the rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §7.5 (Tentative
Draft No. 6, 1997) (restating the rule).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.5 cmt. b (Tentative
draft No. 6, 1997) (illustrating that "[b]ecause a servitude is an interest in land
subject to the Statute of Frauds, [the] intent to recreate the servitude must either
be expressed in a written instrument or... must fall within one of the recognized
exceptions to that requirement").
64. Savard, 369 A.2d at 1365 (stating a "right of way, once it had been extin-
guished by the merger of the two parcels of land, [cannot] be recreated by the
mere subsequent separation of the parcels"); e.g. Civilian Defense, Inc. v. Egan
Ryan Undertaking Co., 152 N.E.2d 159, 159-60 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1957); Wittv. Rea-
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H. The Mortgage Exception To The Merger Doctrine
The merger doctrine becomes more complicated when there
is an outstanding interest in the dominant estate6 5 (e.g. mortgage
6
interest) . The mortgage exception to the merger doctrine is de-
signed to protect the mortgagee's interest in the dominant estate
from being extinguished when the dominant and servient estates
are merged under common ownership. 7 The mortgage exception
was an issue of first impression6 for the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Pergament v. Loring Props., and Minnesota was forced to look at
otherjurisdictions for guidance. 69
65. E.g., Hermitage Cmtys. of N.C., Inc. v. Powers, Inc., 272 S.E.2d 399, 401
(N.C. 1980) (stating the doctrine of merger will not be applied where there is an
outstanding deed of trust on the easement); see also Will v. Gates, 658 N.Y.S.2d 900,
903 (N.Y. 1997) (stating that where only a portion of dominant or servient estate is
acquired by one person and there remain other dominant owners whose rights are
inviolate, the merger doctrine will not terminate the easement); Tower Dev. Part-
ners v. Zell, 461 S.E.2d 17, 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a development
company's attempt to create driveway easements through express grant failed ab
initio where legal title to the tracts had merely been divided between different trus-
tees, and no intermediate estate existed between company's legal and equitable
titles to prevent operation of the merger doctrine).
66. MINN. STAT. § 559.17, subd. 1 (2000) (stating that a mortgage in Minne-
sota is a lien on property and not a conveyance so that a mortgagee is unable to
recover possession without foreclosure and sale); see also Hatlestad v. Mut. Trust
Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 640, 643, 268 N.W. 665, 666-67 (1936) (holding that mort-
gages are no longer a conveyance but are instead a lien on property).
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 497 cmt. d (1944).
[I]f either a dominant or servient tenement held in fee is subject to a
power of termination or to an executory interest, and the fee ownership
in the dominant tenement is united with the fee ownership in the servi-
ent tenement, the power of termination or the executory interest re-
mains unaffected by such unity. Accordingly, if the power of termination
or the executory interest becomes possessory, the possessory estate is en-
titled to the benefit, or remains subject to the burden, of the easement.
Id.
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (7th ed. 1999). "A case that presents the
court with issues of law that have not previously been decided in that jurisdiction."
Id.
69. Duval v. Becker, 32 A. 308, 309-10 (Md. 1895) (stating that allowing the
extinguishment of the mortgagee's interest "would jeopardize, if not wholly de-
stroy, the stability of every mortgage as security"); see also Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d
1086, 1091-92 (Colo. 1996) (distinguishing the meaning of merger as it relates to
easements instead of mortgages); Ritger v. Parker, 8 Cush. 145, 54 Am. Dec. 744,
744 (Mass. 1851) (holding that an easement "is not extinguished by the vesting of
both estates in the same person as mortgagee, under separate mortgages, until
both mortgages are foreclosed"); Schwoyer v. Smith, 131 A.2d 385, 387-88 (Pa.
1957) (relying on Duval and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §
497 to hold that a mortgagee's interest in an easement prevented extinguishment
of an easement by merger).
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III. THE PERGAMENT DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1986, Willow Street Properties (hereinafter "Willow"), the
fee owner of adjacent office and apartment properties, entered
into a contract for deed with BSR Properties (hereinafter "BSR") to
sell the aforementioned properties to BSR. 0 In 1987, BSR paid for
the portion of the deed relating to the apartment property by
mortgaging the apartment property to Midwest Federal Savings and
Loan (hereinafter "Midwest"). As a condition to provide financ-
ing, Midwest required that BSR and Willow create a parking ease-
ment on the office property for the benefit of the apartment prop-
72erty.
In 1988, BSR paid the balance owed on the contract for deed
73to obtain fee tide to the office property. The office property was
mortgaged to Canada Life Assurance Company (hereinafter "Can-
ada Life").74 BSR owned and operated both the apartment and of-
fice properties for two years.' On December 20, 1990, BSR sold
76the office property to Canada Life. Canada Life, in turn, sold the
office property to Loring Properties (hereinafter "Loring") in
1993. In 1997, BSR paid off its mortgage on the apartment prop-
erty to Midwest and then sold the apartment property to Brian A.
Pergament (hereinafter "Pergament"). 
78
When Pergament bought the apartment property, he was ig-
70. Pergament v. Loring Props., Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. 1999). On
November 20, 1987, the City of Minneapolis approved a plan to subdivide the of-
fice and apartment properties into two separate parcels so that BSR was able to
divide payment. Id.; see also Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 2 n.2, Pergament v.
Loring Props., Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999) (No. CX-98-1031) (describing
the apartment and office properties in detail).
71. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 148.
72. Id. See also Pergament v. Loring Props., Ltd., 586 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998) rev'd 599 Minn. N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999) (referencing sections 1
and four of the easement which provided for the right of access and use of eight
parking spaces for the benefit of the apartment property on the office lot).
73. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 148.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. BSR conveyed the office property to "Canada Life in lieu of foreclo-
sure." Id.
77. Id.
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norant of the parking easement.79 In fact, the parking spaces as-
signed in the easement had never been used by the apartment ten-80
ants. Upon learning of the easement, Pergament commenced an
action against Loring to enforce the terms of the parking easement
created by BSR and Willow for the benefit of the apartment prop-
81
erty.
The trial court granted Pergament's motion for summary
judgment and Loring appealed.12 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's holding and found that despite the unity
of title in the dominant and servient estates, the parking easement
had not been extinguished by merger because the apartment
property was encumbered by a separate security interest through-
out BSR's unity of title.8' The court of appeals relied upon the rea-
soning in the Pennsylvania case, Schwoyer v. Smith, where the domi-
nant estate had been acquired from the mortgagee, and the
84
easement was held not to have been extinguished by merger. Be-
cause the Minnesota Court of Appeals found there was no merger,
it was of no consequence that Pergament took his title from BSR
(the mortgagor) instead of Midwest (the mortgagee)."'
Loring filed a Petition for Further Review of the appellate
court's decision. The supreme court granted Loring's request for
further review because the applicability of the mortgage exception
to the merger doctrine was an issue of first impression, which had
not been previously considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court.0
79. Id. "Although the deed from BSR to Pergament mentioned of the ease-





83. Pergament, 586 N.W.2d at 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an
easement cannot be terminated by the merger doctrine when a mortgagee holds
an outstanding interest in the dominant estate), rev'd, 599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn.
1999).
84. Id.
While Schwoyer involved a plaintiff who acquired interest through a mort-
gagee, the [Pennsylvania] court held that an easement will continue to
exist, despite one having title in both the dominant and servient estates,
when at least one of the properties is encumbered by a security interest,
such as a mortgage.
Id. (relying on Schwoyer v. Smith, 388 Pa. 637, 131 A.2d 385 (1957)).
85. Id.
86. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 2, Pergament v. Loring Props., Ltd.,
599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999) (No. CX-98-1031). Loring Properties filed a Peti-
tion for Further Review on January 6, 1999 that was granted by the supreme court
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B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision and
found that the parking easement was extinguished as to BSR and
those who took tide from BSR, when BSR acquired common own-
ership of both the Apartment and office properties. 7 In addition,
the supreme court held that despite the merging of the dominant
and servient estates, Midwest's mortgage interest in the easement
remained viable for Midwest, and anyone who may have taken title
from Midwest, had Midwest's interest become possessory upon
foreclosure. 8
The merger doctrine worked to extinguish the easement to
89BSR and BSR's successors in interest. Pergament acquired title
from BSR and not Midwest. Because BSR's interest in the parking
easement had been extinguished before BSR conveyed the apart-
ment property to Pergament, Pergament acquired no interest in
the parking easement from BSR.90
The supreme court narrowed the appellate court's holding by
limiting the mortgage exception to apply only to those mortgagees
on February 18, 1999. Id.
87. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 149. The supreme court applied the merger
doctrine to establish that when BSR obtained fee title to both the apartment and
office properties in 1998, the easement was effectively terminated as to BSR and its
successors in interest. Id. (relying on Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 56, 19
N.W.2d 394, 398 (1945)). E .g., Sorkil v. Strom, 156 Minn. 155, 158-59, 194 N.W.
333, 334 (1923); RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVrrtDES § 497 (1944).
- 88. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 150.
[I]f either a dominant or servient tenement held in fee is subject to a
power of termination or to an executory interest, and the fee ownership
in the dominant tenement is united with the fee ownership in the servi-
ent tenement, the power of termination or the executory interest re-
mains unaffected by such unity. Accordingly, if the power of termination
or the executory interest becomes possessory, the possessory estate is en-
titled to the benefit, or remains subject to the burden, of the easement.
Id. at n.2 (relying on RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 497 cmt. d.
(1944)); see also Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Frantz Klodt & Son, 306 Minn. 244,
247, 237 N.W.2d 350, 353 (1975) (holding that a mortgage interest is not a posses-
sory interest in land but merely a lien on the property).
89. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 151 (stating the majority's conclusion).
90. Id. at 150-51 (holding that the merger doctrine extinguished BSR's inter-
ests in the easement and thus BSR had no interest in the easement to convey to
Pergament). The supreme court held that the Schwoyer case, relied upon by the
appellate court for its decision, was incorrectly applied to the Pergament case, be-
cause in Schwoyer, the dominant estate was acquired through the mortgagee at the
foreclosure sale, while in Pergament, the dominant estate was acquired through the
mortgagor. Id. at 150.
2000] 1345
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who have a possessory interest in the property.9' Although the dis-
senting opinion agreed with the majority's discussion of the mort-
gage exception, it argued that the merger doctrine is based in eq-
uity; therefore, the case needed to be remanded to the trial court• 92
to give consideration to the intent of the parties.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PERGAMENT DECISION
Even though the doctrine of merger is well established in
Minnesota, the mortgage exception remained virtually untouched
until the Pergament decision.9 The Pergament case is important be-
cause it forced the supreme court to determine the scope of the
mortgage exception as it applied to mortgagees who hold an inter-
94est in a dominant estate.
The effect of the Pergament decision effectively narrowed the
mortgage exception to protect only those morti.agees of the domi-
nant estate whose interests become possessory. 5 If the dominant
and servient estates are merged under one mortgagor, the mortga-
gor's interest in the easement terminates, whereas the mortgagee's
interest in the easement remains suspended until it becomes pos-
sessory6 upon foreclosure or until the mortgagor completes pay-
ment.
Because the crux of the Pergament decision relied on the status
of a mortgagee's interest in an easement during the merging of the
dominant and servient estates, it is necessary to examine the type of
interest a mortgagee holds in an easement. 97 This section analyses
91. Id. at 151. "By concluding that an easement may never be extinguished
while there is a mortgage on the dominant estate, the lower court decisions have
distorted the mortgage exception to the merger doctrine." Id. The mortgage ex-
ception is intended to protect the mortgagee of the dominant estate whose inter-
ests become possessory. Midwest's interest in the dominant estate never became
possessory and remained merely a lien on the property until BSR paid off the
mortgage. Id.
92. Id. at 151-53 (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority on the
application of the mortgage exception, but arguing for remand of the case to the
trial court to discuss the issue of intent which the dissent believes the majority
failed to take into consideration).
93. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 2, Pergament v. Loring Props., Ltd.,
599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999) (No. CX-98-1031).
94. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 147.
95. Id. at 151.
96. Id. at 150 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 497
cmt. d. (1944)).
97. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 149 (relying on the mortgage exception to the
merger doctrine as spelled out in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES §
1346 [Vol. 27:2
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the nature of a mortgagee's interest in an easement and what hap-
pens to a mortgagee's interest after termination of an easement
due to merger. Part A explains how a mortgagee's interest can sur-
vive the merger doctrine while the easement is terminated as to the
fee owners. Part B explains the policy behind protecting a mort-
gagee's security investment. Part C explains why the court did not
consider the issue of intent.
A. The Mortgagee's Interest
The fact that separate interests in the same easement can ter-
minate at different times for different parties, was a concept that
the appellate court found difficult to apply.98 Thus, the issue of
whether there can be a termination of different interests in the
same easement at different times was central to the supreme court's
decision. 99
Appellant cited Cheever v. Graves,100 a Massachusetts case where
the servient lot and several dominant subdivision lots came under
common ownership. 0' The Massachusetts Appellate Court held
that the easement terminated with respect to the dominant lots
under common ownership but not for dominant lots with no com-. 102
mon ownership. The Minnesota Supreme Court used similar rea-
soning and held that a mortgage interest is a separate interest that
can terminate independently of the mortgagor's interest in an
103easement.
Respondent argued that allowing an easement to terminate by
merger while a mortgagor holds an interest in the dominant estate
would undermine the purpose of mortgages as security interests.
0 4
497 cmt. d). It is important to realize that a mortgage is not an estate in property
and therefore a mortgage interest remains unaffected by the merging of the two
estates. Id.
98. Pergament, 586 N.W.2d 778, 782, rev'd, 599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999)
(holding that BSR's interest in the easement could not expire when Midwest held
a concurrent interest in the property).
99. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 147.
100. Cheever v. Graves, 592 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
101. Id. at 762.
102. Id.
103. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 151. "[If] only one of the cotenants in a domi-
nant tenement comes into ownership of the servient tenement, the other cotenant
retains easement rights at the same time as the first cotenant loses them." 7
THOMPSON ON RFAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.08(b) (1) (David A. Thomas
ed. 1994).
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In response, the supreme court held that a mortgagee's interest in
an easement does not terminate automatically along with the mort-
gagor's interest upon merger. Instead, a mortgagee's interest in an
easement remains suspended after a merger until foreclosure.'0 5
The reason is a mortgagee's interest remains a lien' °6 on property
unless it becomes possessory through foreclosure.
07
The merger doctrine is intended to prevent a possessory owner
from holding an easement on his or her own fee.1°8 A mortgagee
holds a non-possessory interest in the easement.0 9  Thus, the
merger doctrine does not work to extinguish the non-possessory in-
terests held by a mortgagee."0 The mortgagee's interest remains
independent and viable even after the easement has terminated as
to the fee owners.111
B. The Mortgage Exception: The Policy Of Protecting Those With Non-
Possessory Interests
As a matter of policy the supreme court limited the mortgage
exception to apply only to those mortgagees and their successors
whose interest in the dominant estate becomes possessory."2 The
mortgage exception protects the value of the mortgagee's security
interest should the mortgagee acquire possession of the dominant
estate through foreclosure. In effect, the mortgage exception in
the case of easements extends only to protect a party who takes title
to the dominant estate from the mortgagee.'14
105. Id. (relying on RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERT': SERVITUDES § 497 cmt.
d (1944)).
106. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 933 (7th ed. 1999). A lien is a "legal right or in-
terest that a creditor has in another's property lasting.. until a debt or duty that it
secures is satisfied." Id.
107. MINN. STAT. § 559.17, subd. 1 (2000). A security interest is not a posses-
sory interest in land but is incident to the ownership of the secured obligation.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFPROPERTY§ 497 cmt. g (1944).
108. POWELL, supra note 19, at § 34.22.
109. MINN. STAT. § 559.17, sub. 1 (2000) (stating a mortgage is not an estate in
property).
110. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 146, 151 (stating the holding).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 151. "This exception is intended only to protect the mortgagee of
the dominant estate, should its interest become possessory, from losing the full
value of its security interests, including the benefit of any easement." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon the Schwoyer case for its
reasoning. Id. at 150. The Schwoyer case reasoned that if the mortgage of the
dominant estate preceded the unity of ownership and possession of the dominant
and servient estates, then "as to the mortgagee, and his successors in interest, the
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The policy behind the mortgage exception works purely to
protect the mortgagee's security interest in the property. 15 It does
not exist to act as a shield to defeat the merger doctrine."' Essen-
tially what the supreme court did in the Pergament decision was to
protect the mortgagee's interest in the dominant estate by allowing
the mortgagee to obtain the benefit of the dominant estate even af-
ter the easement had been extinguished by merger if that mort-
gagee's interest later became posssessory.11
C. The Effect Of The Pergament Decision On Recent Case Law
The reasoning used in the Pergament decision was later dis-
cussed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Ford Consumer Fin. Co.,r 118
Inc. v. Carlson and Breese, Inc. In Ford, the appellant urged the
court to adopt an exception to the doctrine of adverse possession,
which would protect the interests of mortgagees and their succes-
sors, similar to the mortgage exception that exists for the merger
doctrine." 9
The Ford case dealt with a 1993 quiet title action which had
previously extinguished the mortgagor's right to assert an adverse
possession claim over a disputed parcel of land. The mortgagee
(Ford) was not bound by the 1993 judgment because Ford was not
properly served. 12 Appellant (hereinafter Johnson), the successor
in interest to Ford, argues that because the mortgagee (Ford) was
not bound by the 1993 quiet title action,Johnson should be able to
bring an adverse possession by tacking onto Ford's previous inter-
est. Johnson used the Pergament case in supp~ort of her argument
to protect those with non-possessory interests.
easement would continue to exist..." Schwoyer v. Smith, 131 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa.
1957).
115. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 149-50.
116. Id. at 150 (rebutting Pergament's argument).
117. Id.; see also Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Carlson & Breese, Inc., 611 N.W.2d
75, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (commenting on the Pergament decision).
118. 11 N.W.2d 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
119. Id. at 76-78.
120. Id. at 76-77. "The district court also ruled that the 1993 quiet title action
placing title in Carlson was not binding on Ford because it was a known defendant
that was not named or personally served." Id.
121. Id. (explaining the appellant's argument). Appellant (Johnson) claims
that a mortgagee's adverse possession claim is not extinguished if the parties with
possessory rights at the time of a quiet title action failed to contest the claim and
default was entered against them. Johnson claims to have an adverse possession
claim by tacking onto Ford's interest. Id.
122. Id. at 78.
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The court rejected the Johnson's argument because there was
no indication that the mortgagee (Ford) actually had an interest in
the disputed strip of property; and even if it had, Ford's interest in
the strip became possessory well after the 1993 quiet title action
had already vested in Defendants. 23  The court also stated that
Johnson's argument to protect the non-possessory interests of
mortgagees was "inauthentic" since the mortgagee in this case did
not stand to benefit from a decision in appellant's favor.
24
D. Intent
The dissenting opinion stressed that the merger doctrine in
the case of easements is an equitable doctrine, much like the
merger doctrine in the case of mortgages, and equitable factors
should have been taken into consideration as a condition to the125
merger. In contrast, Appellant argued that the merger doctrine
in the case of easements, is different from the merger of mortgages
and that no finding of intent is necessary for the merger to termi-T26
nate the easement. The supreme court followed Minnesota case
123. Id. (pointing out that Appellant's argument presupposes many factors
which would be necessary to make a proper analogy to the mortgage exception as
utilized in the Pergament decision).
[A]fter the 1993judgement extinguished the Nelsons' claim for adverse
possession, Ford could no longer claim that its interests were harmed or
that the value of its security was impaired because Ford's potential pos-
sessory interest in the disputed triangle was dependant upon the Nelson's
interest.
Id.
124. Id. at 78. Ford had already foreclosed and conveyed the property to ap-
pellant "as is" and thus, had no interest in the property at the time of the judg-
ment. Id. at 77. Although the value of Ford's mortgage may have been dimin-
ished by the 1993 quiet title action, appellant's adverse possession claim would not
work to vindicate Ford's interests since Ford no longer had an interest in the
propery. Id. at 78.
125. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 151-53 (Gilbert, J., dissenting) (relying on the
issue of intent as applied ot the merger of mortgages). When mortgages are
merged, the circumstances of the particular case at issue are taken into considera-
tion to protect against the mortgagee from receiving a windfall. Continental Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. King, 72 Minn. 287, 291, 75 N.W. 376, 378 (1898) (holding that the
doctrine of merger in regard to mortgages is a flexible, equitable doctrine and
that each case depends on its own circumstances); see also State ex rel. Interstate
Iron Co. v. Wallace, 196 Minn. 212, 214-15, 264 N.W. 775, 776 (1936) (holding
that no merger would be construed to take place where merger would be adverse
to the lessee's interest).
126. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 9-11, Pergamentv. Loring Props., Ltd.,
599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999) (No. CX-98-1031).
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law regarding the merger doctrine as applied to easements 12' and
did not address the issue of intent when determining whether the
parking easement was terminated by merger."" The Pergament deci-
sion supports the notion that the merger doctrine as applied to
easements does not require the element of intent as does the
merger doctrine as applied to mortgages.29
V. CONCLUSION
The Pergament case presented the Minnesota Supreme Court
the first opportunity to consider the scope of a mortgagee's interest
in an easement when the dominant and servient estates are merged
under one owner. In order to reach its decision, the supreme
court went through several steps. First, a mortgage is a lien on
property and not a possessory interest; second, the merging of
dominant and servient estates does not extinguish a mortgagee's
inchoate interest in an easement; and finally, the mortgage excep-
tion only protects the mortgagee and the mortgagee's successors in
interest. As a matter of policy, an easement can be extinguished as
to a mortgagor, while at the same time, remain viable for a mortga-
gor with an inchoate interest in the easement.
127. Sorkil v. Strom, 155 Minn. 155, 158-159, 194 N.W. 333, 334 (1923) (rec-
ognizing the merger doctrine). "It is true enough that when an owner of an estate
enjoys an easement over another estate and acquires title to the latter the ease-
ment is thereby extinguished." Id. Case law in other states also follows this rule.
See also Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Colo. 1996) (holding that merger as
it relates to easements does not require the element of intent); Witt v. Reavis, 587
P.2d 1005, 1008 (Or. 1978) (holding that the merger of dominant and servient
estates automatically extinguishes easements); but cf. Smith v. Lytle, 6 N.W. 625,
626-27 (Minn. 1880) (holding that the doctrine of merger "has no application
where it is clearly for the interest of the party holding the two estates that they be
kept separate and distinct").
128. Pergament, 599 N.W.2d at 146, 150 n.4 (holding that the case need not be
remanded to the trial court for consideration of the issue of intent).
129. Compare Thompson v. First Nat'l Bank, 180 Minn. 552, 555, 231 N.W. 234,
236 (1930) (holding that the merger doctrine as applied to mortgages takes into
consideration the intention and well-being of the person in whom interests are
united), with Sorkil v. Strom, 155 Minn. 155, 158-159, 194 N.W. 333, 334 (1923)
(holding that an easement terminates at law the instant the dominant and servient
estates are united under common ownership and possession).
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